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Abstract
I argue that fictional models, construed asmodels that misrepresent certain ontological
aspects of their target systems, can nevertheless explain why the latter exhibit certain
behaviour. They can do this by accurately representingwhatever it is that that behaviour
counterfactually depends on. However, we should be sufficiently sensitive to different
explanatory questions, i.e., ‘why does certain behaviour occur?’ versus ‘why does the
counterfactual dependency invoked to answer that question actually hold?’. With this
distinction in mind, I argue that whilst fictional models can answer the first sort of
question, they do so in an unmysterious way (contra to what one might initially think
about suchmodels).Moreover, I claim that the second question poses a dilemma for the
defender of the idea that fictions can explain: either these models cannot answer these
sorts of explanatory questions, precisely because they are fictional; or they can, but in
a way that requires reinterpreting them such that they end up accurately representing
the ontological basis of the counterfactual dependency, i.e., reinterpreting them so as
to rob them of their fictional status. Thus, the existence of explanatory fictions does
not put pressure on the idea that accurate representation of some aspect of a target
system is a necessary condition on explaining that aspect.
Keywords Models · Fictions · Representation · Explanation
1 Introduction
Suppose someone asks you why the difference between high and low tide, the tidal
range, changes throughout the lunar month. You might answer that it’s the relative
positions of the sun, the moon, and the earth that explain this difference. Depending
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on the lunar cycle, either the sun and themoon are positioned in such away as to ensure
that their gravitational forces align, thus producing spring tides (the tidal effect of the
sun and the moon reinforce each other), or their force vectors are at right-angles to
one-another, thereby producing neap tides (the smaller solar tidal effect is orthogonal
to the larger lunar effect). Spring tides are higher (at high tide, and lower at low tide)
than neap tides, so during spring tides the tidal range is greater than during neap tides.
I think that this explains why the tidal range varies across the lunar month.
But there is a complication. This answer involves a ‘fiction’. There’s no such thing
as Newtonian gravitation. From our current perspective the ocean isn’t acted on by
a gravitational force; it’s just trying to ‘go straight in a crooked world’ (Bokulich
2016, p. 273).1 Nevertheless, it doesn’t seem detrimental to the model that it involves
such a force, indeed involves such a force essentially (without the force there is no
such model and no explanation), and moreover there doesn’t seem to be any scientific
or philosophical pressure to attempt to replace the explanation based on the force
model with one that doesn’t involve such a fiction, i.e., one that made reference to the
curvature of a spacetime manifold instead (if this could be done at all).
To a philosopher, this might seem puzzling. The model that explains why the tidal
range changes throughout the month seems to represent it as being induced by some-
thing that we know isn’t there in the world. In this sense the model is an explanatory
fiction. But how can fictions explain? And if they do, do we need to develop a philo-
sophical account of explanation that gives up on the requirement that explanations are
accurate representations?
I argue that this puzzle arises from two conflicting intuitions or observations. The
first is that accurate representation is necessary for explanation. The second is that
fictional models, which on the face of it are inaccurate in crucial respects, nevertheless
provide explanations. In this paper I show how this conflict can be dissolved. First
by disambiguating the request for a ‘first-order’ explanation (in this case: ‘why does
the tidal range vary across the lunar month?’) from the request for a ‘second-order’
explanation (‘why does what explains such a variance play the explanatory role that it
does?’). Then, if fictional models are taken to provide first-order explanations (only),
they do sowithout being inaccurate in the relevant respects. Second, if fictional models
are also taken to provide second-order explanations (which is much less clear), then
we should reconsider their fictional status. A closer look at the explanatory uses of
fictional models will demonstrate that they do not conflict with the idea that accuracy
is necessary for explanation. So whilst this paper is framed in terms of whether or
not fictional models explain, its broader target is a defence of the idea that accurate
representation is necessary for explanation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 I clarify two notions of ‘fiction’
that have been invoked in the literature on scientific representation and explanation. I
distinguish between the sense of fiction as ontology (a work of fiction), and the sense
of fiction as inaccuracy (fiction as misrepresentation). It’s the latter which is primarily
relevant to the question of whether or not fictions can explain in some philosophically
interesting sense. In Sect. 3 I introduce Bokulich’s (2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2011; 2012;
2018a; 2018b) account ofmodel explanation, which is explicitly designed to allow that
1 Bokulich reports that she owes this expression to John Stachel.
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(inaccurate) fictional models explain, and thus puts pressure on the idea that accurate
representation is necessary for explanation.2 The crucial aspect of this account is that
a model explains some phenomenon by accurately representing its modal profile, i.e.
how it would change were various other features to change (and that this can be done
even if the model inaccurately represents the ontology of the target). In Sect. 4 I draw
on a distinction between first-order and second-order explanations (cf. Skow 2016,
2017) and claim that Bokulich’s examples are ambiguous between them (in doing
so I also show how Skow’s distinction can be utilised without adopting his account
wholesale). In Sect. 4.1 I argue that (inaccurate) fictional models can offer first-order
explanations of certain phenomena, but they do so in such a way that their fictional
nature doesn’t feature in the explanation itself. In Sect. 4.2 I pose a dilemma for a
staunch defender of the view fictional models can explain: either they can provide
second-order explanations, but they do so because they are interpreted such that they
end up accurately representing the ontological basis of the counterfactual dependency,
i.e., reinterpreting them so as to rob themof their fictional status; or they cannot provide
such explanations, precisely because they are fictional, i.e., they are interpreted literally
and therefore misrepresent said ontological basis. Section 5 concludes by emphasising
that accurate representation, at least of both the features of the target that are to be
explained, the explananda, and the features that do the explaining, the explanantia,
remains a necessary condition on scientific explanation (or at least that fictionalmodels
do not challenge this).
2 Fictional models
At least some scientific models are fictions. What does this mean? For the likes of
Godfrey-Smith (2006), Frigg (2010), Frigg and Nguyen (2016a), and others, this is
an attempt to analyse the ontology of scientific models. The idea is that, ontologically
speaking at least, scientific models should be thought of as akin to the situations
described by works of fiction. Just as we can talk about a farmyard populated by
animals—a pig called ‘Napoleon’, a horse called ‘Boxer’, and so on—who interact
with each other in various ways—enacting different governing polices and engaging in
revolutions—we can also talk about fictional systems like idealised pendula, celestial
bodies subject to gravitational forces, and populations of animals with unlimited food.
Advocates of this view of fictional models urge us to think of the sorts of systems that
are described in scientific textbooks and research papers as akin to the sorts of systems
that are described in works of fiction.
Of course without an account of the nature of fictional situations, this approach
risks analysing the already confusing (what models are) in terms of something just
as obscure (what fictions are). Luckily, philosophers of science can appeal to various
different accounts offered in discussions of the ontology and metaphysics of fiction in
order to cash out the analogy. Some prefer to think that thismeans that scientificmodels
2 I focus on Bokulich’s work throughout since, to my mind, she provides the clearest expression of the
tension between fictional models in science and the role of accuracy in explanation. For other useful
discussions of fictional models see the papers collected in Suárez (2009a) and Woods (2010), and the
references in Sect. 2.
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are abstract artefacts created by humans but existing as abstracta independently of us
(Thomasson 2020). Others adopt a more deflationary view and take it to mean that
scientific models are imaginary entities that are associated with Waltonian ‘games of
make-believe’ (Frigg 2010; Frigg and Nguyen 2016a). And in principle any position
concerning the nature of fictional entities could be utilised in service of developing an
account of what scientific models are, ontologically speaking.
However this is worked out, it’s crucial to note that when we shift from the onto-
logical question (what models are) to the semantic question (how they represent their
target systems), or functional question (what role they play in scientific practice, which
is the focus of most contributors to Suárez (2009a)), nothing in that version of the fic-
tional account demands that ‘fictional’ models in this sense are in any way ‘false’ or
‘inaccurate’ representations of their actual target systems. I believe that the world of
Orwell’s Animal Farm is an accurate representation of the political pressures faced by
the USSR. But even if this is disputed (e.g. because the Politburo didn’t convene in
a farmyard), there are plenty of other works of fiction where the situations described
in the work are present in the real world too. For example, Cambridge, as described
in Faulk’s Englby, matches Cambridge in the real world, and the Dublin described
in Rooney’s Normal People matches the real Irish capital. Actual scenarios can be
described in works of fiction, and those scenarios needn’t be ‘false’ or ‘inaccurate’
representations of the real world. Fictional models in this sense do not need to raise
any novel explanatory questions.
However, ‘fiction’ has another reading, a reading that does connote inaccuracy.
In this sense it might be considered fictional that the audience at Donald Trump’s
inauguration was the biggest ever, or fictional that he won the biggest margin in the
US electoral college since Ronald Reagan. One way of understanding this sense of
fiction is in terms of truth-values. A sentence is fictional in this sense only if it is
false, or alternatively if its truth-value is not relevant to the function it is deployed for
(Suárez 2009b, pp. 11–13). In the context of model-based science things are a little
more complicated for two reasons. First, and most importantly, following Weisberg
(2007b), and indeed themajority of the contemporary literature on scientificmodelling,
I characterise model-based science in terms of its indirect nature.3 As such, model
descriptions (which are linguistic) specify, or somehow describe, model systems, and
it is the latter that are the units that represent the target systems of interest.4 So on
the indirect account, model descriptions are, strictly speaking, not the ‘fictional’ items
involved in the explanations: their truth-values aren’t evaluated with respect to target
systems; they’re evaluated with respect to the model systems they specify, and this
isn’t at issue when it comes to how ‘fictional’ (inaccurate) models, or indeed any of
kind of model, explain(s).
3 For dissenting voices see Toon (2010a, b, 2012) and Levy (2012, 2015).
4 If we were to adopt the ‘fiction view of models’ discussed previously these models would be fictional
scenarios, but I am not committed to this analysis here. Other options are that these model systems are




Since it’s the model systems that are the primary units of representation, how
should we understand them as providing ‘fictional’ (inaccurate) explanations? This
depends on how the model systems are understood as representations, which brings
us to our second complication. Model systems are not obviously truth-bearers.5
They represent their targets in a manner analogous to the way in which maps, or
concrete models—such as the Phillips–Newlyn machine (Frigg and Nguyen 2018),
ball-and-stick models of molecules (Toon 2011), or the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers model of San Francisco Bay (Weisberg 2013)—represent their targets. As
Giere (1994, p. 11), notes (with particular reference to maps), such representations
‘have many of the representational features we need for understanding how scien-
tists represent the world. There is no such thing as a universal map. Neither does
it make sense to question whether a map is true or false’. So when models are fic-
tional in the sense that Trumpian boasts are fictional, rather than saying they are
false, it’s better to say that such a model is an inaccurate representation of its tar-
get.6
But here one might object that all models are inaccurate in some respect (Teller
2001). And if this is the case then all models are fictional in this sense. That doesn’t
seem right. Bokulich (2008a, b, 2011, 2012, 2018a, b) draws a distinction between
models that introduce kinds of entities, properties, states, or processes (‘features’
for short) known not to be present in the target system, and those that distort the
actual features of the target. The former are appropriately dubbed ‘fictional’ models
in the sense that they (seem to, see Sect. 4.2) inaccurately represent the kinds of
ontological features present in the target system,whereas the latter accurately represent
the kinds of ontological features that are present, but do so in a way that distorts their
details.
Now, notice that these models do represent actual systems in the world, they
just misrepresent certain ontological features of those systems. As such, these
models are ‘fictive’ in Suárez (2009b, c) sense, and should be distinguished from
what he calls ‘fictional’ models, i.e. representations of systems that don’t exist.7
Models that represent non-actual targets raise all sorts of interesting questions
(as do models that don’t represent any target whatsoever, non-actual or other-
wise (cf. Weisberg 2013, Chapter 7)). However, if fictional models are to put
pressure on the idea that accurate representation is necessary for explanation, the
puzzle is most pressing when the thing that is to be explained is something in
the actual world, not something that doesn’t exist. Moreover, as we will see,
Bokulich’s preferred examples of explanatory fictions are precisely models that
are targeted at actual systems (e.g. tidal behaviour). So from now on I will use
the term ‘fictional model’ to refer to a model which (i) represents an actual tar-
get system; but (ii) misrepresents that system’s ontology. We can try to clarify
5 For a dissenting voice see Mäki (2011).
6 Notice that the distinction drawn by Suárez (2009b, pp. 11–13) in terms of thinking about fictions in truth-
conditional or functional terms, i.e. in terms of inaccuracy or in terms of the irrelevance of accuracy, carries
over here. We can also talk about fictional models in the sense that they have aspects whose representational
(in)accuracy is irrelevant to their function.
7 So notice that, as a matter of unfortunate terminology, I’m using the term ‘fictional’ as he uses ‘fictive’,
rather than as he uses ‘fictional’. I address his work in Sect. 4.2.
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this by (very briefly) recapping the examples that Bokulich uses to illustrate her
account.
Newtonian tides
Bokulich (2016, Sect. V) cites the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) website for a standard explanation of the tides. The explanation is given by
considering a Newtonian model of the moon-earth system. The bodies in the model
are assumed to revolve together around their common centres of mass. They are held
together by a gravitational attraction force, and simultaneously kept apart by an equal
(only at the centres) and opposite centrifugal force resulting from their individual
revolutions around their common centre of mass. On the surface, i.e. not the centre, of
the earth (in the model) there is an imbalance between these forces: in the hemisphere
of the earth closest to the moon (in the model) there is net tide-producing force acting
in the direction of the moon’s gravitational attraction, and on the hemisphere opposite
the moon there is a net tide-producing force acting in the direction of the centrifugal
force, i.e., away from themoon. These two forces result in two tidal bugles on opposite
sides of the earth (high tides). We can introduce a third body to our model, the sun,
which exerts an analogous differential force in its revolution around the earth–sun
centre of mass.8 However, since the tide-producing force (in the model) is inversely
proportional to r3, where r is the distance between the celestial bodies between which
the force holds, and the sun is further from the earth than themoon, despite its mass the
sun exerts only half of the force exerted by the moon on the earth resulting in a smaller
tidal bulge.9 When the sun and the moon are aligned their respective tidal bulges
reinforce each other (spring tides), when they are orthogonal to one another there is
destructive interference producing neap tides. This is what explains the variance in
tidal range across a lunar month.
As Bokulich (2016) points out, force models are also used to explain vast numbers
of other complications that arisewith the tides (why some areas only have one high tide
a day, what effect the depth of the ocean has on the tides, and so on). The crucial thing
about all of these models (Bokulich argues) is that gravity (in the model) is identified
with a classical force. The model’s gravitational forces are Newtonian; proportional
to the masses of the objects involved and the reciprocal of the square of their distance
from one another. But, at least according to general relativity, we know that gravity
is actually ‘the curved geodesic structure of a 4-D spacetime manifold whose metric
is determined, in accordance with the Einstein field equations, by the stress-energy
tensor of the matter fields’ (Bokulich 2016, p. 273). Gravity (in the world) is not a
classical force; it’s the curvature of spacetime. So gravity (in the model) is a fiction.
It doesn’t distort the known features of the target, the curvature of the manifold, it
8 We needn’t actually construct and calculate the details of a three-body model for the sort of explanation
I am concerned with in this paper.
9 It’s worth noting here that the tide-producing force (in the model) is inversely proportional to r3 even
though the gravitational force (in the model) is inversely proportional to r2. This is because the former
concerns the difference between the forces at various positions on the earth’s surface.
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introduces a new kind of feature, a force vector between bodies in the model, which
we know isn’t actually in the target system. This makes the model fictional.
Quantum dot
Bokulich Bokulich (2008a, b, 2011, 2012) draws on a wealth of examples from semi-
classical physics, both to develop a novel understanding of the relationship between
classical and quantum physics, and to motivate her account of what fictional models
are and how they explain (it’s more accurate to say that she takes it for granted that
these models explain and this requires developing a novel philosophical account of
explanation to accommodate them). Here I’ll focus on her discussion of quantum dots
(Bokulich 2012), a specific kind of target system related to quantum scarring (which is
discussed throughout her work). A quantum dot is a semiconductor in which electrons
are confined to a very small 2D plane. When a quantum dot is weakly coupled to
external leads there is the possibility of an electron tunnelling into the dot. At certain
voltages one can compensate for the Coulomb repulsion of the electron already in the
dot, and the charge in the dot will fluctuate between N and N + 1 electrons, resulting
in a series of peaks in the dot’s conductance. In order to understand the patterns of
conductance we construct a model that matches the shape of the dot (and includes the
the external leads and so on), and investigate which classical orbits would be allowed
within the dot. Because of the dot’s irregular shape the classical system is ergodic,
which means almost all of the trajectories are not periodic. But there is an (infinite,
but measure 0) set of unstable orbits that are periodic, and it’s these that correspond
to the peaks in the conductance of the dot:
the period of modulation of the Coulomb-blockade peaks is determined by the
periods of the classical orbit that intersects with the leads, the frequency of the
oscillations is proportional to the area covered by the orbit, and the peak distri-
bution is determined by the Lyapunov exponent of the classical orbit (Bokulich
2012, p. 729).
Themodel thus represents the patterns of conductanceof the dot as beingdetermined
via the voltage and position of the external leads, understood quantummechanically in
terms of the initial conditions of an electron’s wavefunction, and the shape of the dot
itself (in terms of which of its internal orbits are periodic). However, the model does
so by invoking the idea that electrons within the dot follow classical orbits, something
we know isn’t the case. In fact, the pattern of conductance peaks, and indeed quantum
scarring more generally, is known to actually be determined by complex interference
patterns in the electrons’ wavefunctions, which are themselves properly thought of
as spread out throughout the dot. So classical orbits (in the model of the dot) are a
fiction. The model doesn’t distort the known ontology of the dot, the wavefunction, it
introduces a novel kind of feature, electrons following classical orbits, that we know
isn’t actually present in the target system.
So what these case studies demonstrate is that fictional models (seemingly, again
see Sect. 4.2) misrepresent the ontological features present in a target in a way that
involves introducing novel kinds of features—Newtonian forces, classical orbits—
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known not to be present in the target system. In contrast, idealised models that are not
fictions should be analysed in terms of distorting the features known to be present. For
my current purposes this suffices to distinguish what I mean by fictional models.10
Now, whilst there are various treatments of the epistemic capabilities of idealised
models that distort known target features (e.g. McMullin 1985; Jones 2005; Weisberg
2007a; Strevens 2008;Nguyen2020), the question of howfictionalmodels,models that
invoke features known not to be present, work has not, to the best of my knowledge,
been explicitly addressed in these terms (beyond Bokulich’s work). And it’s these
sorts of models that seem to pose a particularly novel kind of philosophical puzzle.
If a fictional model M of some target system T represents T ’s behaviour as being
generated by a completely different ontological feature of T than the one we know is
actually present, then how can M play an explanatory role? In contrast, representing
T ’s behaviour as being generated by some feature of T that we know is there, but
inaccurately representing the way that the feature generates the behaviour, seems to
pose a different and (possibly) less threatening kind of puzzle (or at least a puzzle
that many authors have already attempted to address). The aforementioned models are
cases in point. The Newtonian model, if interpreted literally, represents the differences
in tidal range as being determined by the relative positions/masses of the sun and the
moon with respect to the earth, via the gravitational forces of each on the latter. The
quantum dot model, if interpreted literally, represents the conductance patterns as
being determined by the initial conditions (e.g., the shape of the dot), via the periodic
classical orbits that they allow. But we know that there’s no such thing as gravitational
force and that electrons do not follow classical orbits. So how do thesemodels explain?
Before addressing that question itwill prove useful to specifywhat itmeans for amodel
to explain. That is the task of the next section.
3 Model explanation
What it means for models to explain is a thorny topic. For my current purposes I’m
focusing on models that explain via representing certain counterfactual dependencies
that hold in the target. It’s important to note that I’m not claiming that this exhausts all
kinds of model explanations.11 For my current purposes what matters is just that some
models explain via representing dependencies, and that some of thesemodels appear to
be fictional in the sense discussed in the previous section. In the first instance it’s these
10 I’m not claiming that there is a strict clear distinction here. One might be able to reinterpret the distortion
of a known feature as the introduction of a new (non-actual) ontological feature, and vice versa. This strikes
me as analogous to the fact that we can reinterpret cases of abstraction (e.g. a model that ignores friction)
as idealisation (e.g. a model that misrepresents a friction coefficient as 0) (Jones 2005). However, I do think
we have enough of a pre-theoretical grasp of the fiction/non-fiction distinction to motivate the rest of the
discussion.
11 For example I’m leaving it open that: models can explain by providing comparison cases (Kennedy 2012;
Jebeile and Kennedy 2015); by demonstrating that previously held necessity or impossibility hypotheses are
false (Grüne-Yanoff 2009); by demonstrating various features of the theories in which they are embedded
(Luczak 2017); via renormalisation group transformations (Batterman and Rice 2014); and other forms of
non-causal explanation (Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018), and that models might offer these kinds of explanation
in a manner that doesn’t involve the representation of counterfactuals.
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kinds of model explanations that seem to threaten the idea that explanation requires
accurate representation. So in order to get a handle on how fictional models explain
it’s useful to analyse cases where the notion of explanation is as straightforward as
possible, to ensure that we keep in focus the fictional aspects of models that play such
explanatory roles. As such we can set aside the complications that arise from more
exotic forms of model explanations.
Bokulich (2008a, b, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2018a, b) develops an account of model
explanation that is explicitly geared to allow for fictional models to explain in this
way. The account involves threemain claims: first, the explanationmustmake essential
reference to a scientific model; second,
that model explains the explanandum by showing how there is a pattern of
counterfactual dependence of the relevant features of the target system on the
structures represented in the model. That is, the elements of the model can, in a
very loose sense, be said to ‘reproduce’ the relevant features of the explanandum.
Furthermore, as the counterfactual condition implies, the model should also
be able to give information about how the target system would behave, if the
structures represented in the model were changed in various ways (Bokulich
2008a, p. 226; cf. Bokulich 2011, p. 39);
and third, the model explanation must satisfy a ‘justificatory step’ that specifies what
the domain of applicability of the model is, and shows that the phenomenon in the real
world to be explained falls within that domain.12
My primary focus here is on the second condition (although I return to the third
in Sect. 4.2). Drawing on Woodward (2003), Bokulich argues that this condition
requires thatmodels explain in virtue of answering ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’
questions, or w-questions.13 As Woodward puts it, such an explanation provides
‘information about a pattern of counterfactual dependence between explanans and
explanandum’ (2003 p. 11), and:
an explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer what I call a what-if-
things-had-been-different question: the explanation must enable us to see what
sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited
in the explanans had been different in various possible ways. We can also think
of this as information about a pattern of counterfactual dependence between
explanans and explanandum (ibid.).
The conclusion that Bokulich draws from this, combined with her case studies as
evidence, is that a model can answer w-questions even whilst misrepresenting the
ontology of the system, i.e., being fictional. If correct, this would seem to put pressure
on the idea that accurate representation is a necessary condition for explanation.
12 Bokulich (2018b, p. 143) offers a fourth condition to allow for multiple explanations of the same
explanandum. I agree with this condition. I won’t talk about it here.
13 Bokulich departs fromWoodward in not spelling this condition out in terms ofmanipulability or interven-
tion. This is deliberate in the sense that it is supposed to allowher account to capture non-causal explanations.
For discussion of this aspect of her account see Saatsi and Pexton (2013) and Schindler (2014). For my
current purposes I’m focusing on how it works when the explanations in question are causal, but this doesn’t
make too much of a difference to the issues I’m discussing.
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The problem, however, is that when stated like this, the counterfactual condition
doesn’t fully specify the relationship between the ‘things which could have been
different’ and the fictional aspects of themodel. In particular, I think that this condition
is ambiguous between two different readings, and as we will see, it’s this ambiguity
which makes the fact that fictional models can explain seem mysterious.
The first reading can be specified as follows. We will say that: a modelM explains
a target’s behaviour, A (the explanandum), only ifM accurately represents A and accu-
rately represents the counterfactual dependency of A on some other target feature, B
(the explanans). More precisely, taking care to keep reference to features of the model
and features of the target distinct:
CounterfactualModel Explanation Condition: for a modelM of a target T, where T
has a feature Awhich can take values in {A1, A2, ..., An};M explains A only if:M has
a featurePwhich can take values in {P1, P2, ..., Pn′ };P accurately representsA;M has
a featureQwhich can take values in {Q1, Q2, ..., Qm′ };Q accurately represents some
feature in the target Bwhich can take values in {B1, B2, ..., Bm}; and the dependencies
of the values of P on the values ofQ accurately represents how the values of A depend
on the values of B.14
In the simplest case we might have bijections between each of these sets of values in
such a way that specifying a value Qi in the model serves to both represent a value
of Bj , a feature in the target, and also fixes a value of Pk in the model such that Pk
accurately represents the value Al in the target that would arise were Bj the actual
value of B in the target.15 So, in order for a model to explain some behaviour A of the
target system, it needs to accurately represent that behaviour, the explanandum (via
the feature P of the model), and accurately represent the explanans of that behaviour
B (via the feature Q of the model), in the sense that the model accurately represents
how A would change, were B to change.16
I take it that this captures what Bokulich means when she says that in cases of
model explanation ‘we require that the counterfactual structure of [the model] be
isomorphic in the relevant respects to the counterfactual structure of [the phenomenon
to be explained]’ (2011, pp. 39, 43) (she admits that she is using isomorphism in a
loose sense), and that in cases of model explanation ‘the elements of the model can,
in a very loose sense, be said to ‘reproduce’ the relevant features of the explanandum’
(Bokulich 2008a, p. 226; cf. Bokulich 2011, p. 39).17 Moreover, I take it that this is
suggested in discussions such as the following:
the semiclassical model allows one to answer a wider variety of w-questions
about how the systemwould behave if certain parameters were changed-and pro-
14 Although this condition is phrased as a necessary condition, I restrict its scope to cases where models
explain by accurately representing a target’s counterfactual behaviour. I’m open to other ways in which
models can perform explanatory roles, cf. fn. 11.
15 By ‘simplest case’ I mean simple in the sense of simple to philosophically analyse, not simple in the
sense that the explanation is scientifically simple.
16 It’s worth noting here that I’m allowing the variables A and B to range over observable and unobservable
features of the target system. I’m grateful to Juha Saatsi for encouraging me to be explicit about this.
17 This is also how Fang (2019) interprets her account.
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vides this information without having to explicitly carry out the tedious quantum
calculations for each possible case (Bokulich 2008a, p. 233),
and when citing (Narimanov et al. 2001):
the semiclassical model allows physicists to answer a wide range of what-if-
things-had-been-different questions. As Narimanov et al. write, from this model
they now understand “how as a system parameter varies [such as] the magnetic
field, for instance, or the number of electrons in the dot ([as] controlled by
varying a gate voltage) - the interference around each periodic orbit oscillates
... When the interference is constructive for those periodic orbits which come
close to the leads used to contact the dot, the wavefunction is enhanced near the
leads, the dot-lead coupling is stronger, and so the conductance is larger” (2001,
p. 2) (Bokulich 2012, p. 731).18
In the case of the Newtonian model of the tides both the explanandum, A: the tidal
range in the target, and the explanans, B: the relative positions and masses of the sun,
moon, and earth, are accurately represented by the model. (If you’re concerned that
gravity isn’t in the explanans here, bear with me for now; this is addressed below.)
Such a model works to explain the tidal range because it specifies how the tides would
vary were the positions/masses of the celestial bodies varied (I don’t just mean ‘vary’
in the sense in which they follow their orbits, the model also works to specify how the
tides would vary if the bodies were in positions outside of their orbits too, or different
masses). In the case of the quantum scarring model, again, both the explanandum,
A: the patterns in the conductance peaks that are observed, and the explanans, B: the
initial condition of the system, including the parameters referenced by Narimanov
et al. (2001) in the above quotation, are accurately represented by the model.
The models in question then provide answers to w-questions, where the things
that could have been different are the positions/masses of the celestial bodies, or
the initial conditions of the wavefunction (for example). Notice though, that when
described in these terms, the model in question is an accurate representation of both
the explanans and the explanandum in each case: in particular, neithermodel is fictional
with respect to either the positions of the celestial bodies, or the initial conditions of
the wavefunction (and both models accurately represent the target of the explanation,
the tidal range and conductance peaks respectively).
There is, however, another reading of Bokulich’s second condition of model expla-
nation. Recall that she requires that ‘the model should also be able to give information
about how the target system would behave, if the structures represented in the model
were changed in various ways’ (Bokulich 2008a, p. 226; cf. Bokulich 2011, p. 39).
The question is: what does the phrase ‘the structures represented in the model’ refer
to? Under one reading (the one just discussed), it refers to whatever it is that the rel-
evant target behaviour counterfactually depends upon. But under another reading it
refers to the whatever it is that underpins this counterfactual relationship, which in the
18 Here I assume that the ‘parameters’ referred to in these quotes are parameters that the target system
that interest actually has; whether or not its in a magnetic field; the shape of the quantum dot; the initial
conditions of the wavefunction; the voltage; the resulting pattern of conductance peaks; and so on. Another
interpretation of this phrase is offered below.
123
Synthese
models in question correspond to their fictional aspects. Under this reading the model
answers w-questions where the things that could have been different are fictional: if
gravitational force had been proportional to r4 rather than r2, or if the classical orbits
within the quantum dot had been different. This reading is also suggested at various
points throughout Bokulich’s work:
this pattern of dependence allows one to say precisely how the quantum wave-
function morphology would change if, for example, the classical periodic orbit
had been different, or if the Lyapunov exponent of that same orbit had taken on
another value (Bokulich 2008a, p. 227; cf. Bokulich 2008b, p. 157)
and
Bohr’s model is able to correctly answer a number of ‘what-if-things-had-been-
different questions,’ such as how the spectrum would change if the orbits were
elliptical rather than circular (Bokulich 2011, p. 43).
Under this alternative reading, the explanatory questions being answered by the
model are different. The question is no longer the first-order ‘why does T exhibit A?’
(that question is answered by a model accurately representing A’s dependence on B).
The question is now the second-order ‘why does T ’s behaviour A depend on B?’ The
latter kind of question is now answered by the following:
Second-Order Model Explanation Condition:M explains A’s dependence on B (in
the target) only if M accurately represents that A depends on B (in the target) (by
meeting the Counterfactual Model Explanation Condition) and has a feature R
that accurately represents whatever target feature C, it is that A’s dependence on B
itself depends upon.19
In the case of the tidal model, againA is the tidal range andB is the relative positions
and masses of the sun, moon, and earth, but the explanandum has shifted. Now, rather
than trying to explain A itself, a model that meets the second condition attempts to
provide an explanatory answer to the question ‘why does A depend on B’ and the
explanans given invokes R, the gravitational force (in the model) that is supposed to
represent whatever it is that provides the basis for the counterfactual dependency of A
onB (and in themodel, does in fact provide the basis for the counterfactual dependence
of P on Q). Similarly, in the case of the quantum scarring model, the model no longer
attempts to explain A, the conductance patterns, via representing its dependency on B,
the initial conditions, but rather attempts to explain why A depends on B. And it does
so by invoking R, the classical orbits that are supposed to represent whatever it is that
provide the basis for why A or more generally, quantum scarring, depends on B. Let’s
now investigate the distinction between first-order and second-order explanations and
w-questions in more detail.
19 For the cases relevant here C will itself be another aspect of the target system. But as I discuss in the
following section this might not be the case for explanations in general.
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4 Levels of explanation
Once we grant that models explain by answering w-questions, we can distinguish
between different kinds of w-questions in a way that corresponds to two different
kinds of explanation that models can provide:
First-order:
i ‘Why does T have behaviour A?’
ii M explains T ’s having A only ifM accurately represents A’s counterfactual depen-
dence on feature B of the target (CounterfactualModel Explanation Condition)
iii M provides answers to what-if-B-had-been-different questions.
Second-order:
i ‘Why does A depend on B?’
ii M explains why A depends on B only if M accurately represents C, which A’s
dependence on B, itself depends on (Second-Order Model Explanation Condi-
tion).
iii M provides answers to what-if-C-had-been-different questions.
The shift from a first-order explanation to a second-order explanation concerns the
explanatory depth of the model in question. There are at least two ways of thinking
about ‘explanatory depth’. First, one could consider a ‘chain’ of causes (or depen-
dencies): one explains something by representing its cause, and then provides more
explanatory depth by representing the cause of the cause, and so on. Another way of
thinking about explanatory depth however, is to explain why the initial explanation
explains in the way it does. In this case, one explains something by representing its
cause (or dependencies), and then provides more depth by explaining why the causal
relationship initially invoked holds in the way that it does. Figuratively, the first kind
of explanatory depth concerns extending a chain of dependencies, the second concerns
providing more detail about a section of the chain itself. It is the latter that I’m inter-
ested in in here. The explanans provided by a model to a first-order question becomes
the explanandum of the second-order question: if a model answers the question ‘why
A?’ with ‘A depends on B’, then this first-order explanans becomes the second-order
explanandum, whose explanans is an answer to the second-order question ‘why does
A depend on B?’.20 With this in mind we can now turn to how the fictional models
discussed above answer first-order and second-order explanatory questions.
4.1 Fictions and first-order explanations
I hope that by now it is straightforward to see how the Newtonian model of the tides
and the quantum dot model provide first-order explanations for tidal behaviour and
the patterns of conductance respectively. They do so by accurately representing those
20 This distinction loosely matches Skow’s distinction between what he calls first-order and second-order
reasons for some phenomena (Skow 2017, p. 907; cf. Skow 2016, Chapter 4.2), although note that I’m
talking about explanations rather than reasons, and I’m not attempting to provide a ‘universalist’ account
of explanation; I’m focusing on cases where the explanations in question are given in terms of causal
counterfactuals, without claiming that this is how all explanations work.
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features of their targets, and what it is that they counterfactually depend on, namely
the positions/masses of the sun, moon, and earth, and the initial conditions of the
wavefunction in quantum dots. Now the crucial thing to note here is that although
the models are fictional (in the sense that they misrepresent their targets in certain
ways), and although these fictional aspects play an essential role in the first-order
explanations they offer (without them we wouldn’t have the models that represent the
relevant dependencies), the fictional aspects themselves don’t feature in the first-order
explanations. The models explain by representing how changes to the explanans yield
changes to the explananda, and they do so accurately despite the fact that in the model
the features which represent these aspects of the target are connected to each other via
a feature (gravity, classical orbits) that itself misrepresents the features of the target.
In both cases, the model provides an explanation of the behaviour A by answering
certain w-questions: namely, questions of the form ‘what would happen to A if B
were different?’. These answers explain A by showing that it depends on B. And when
answering these questions, the fact that the model contains fictional elements (in the
sense that they inaccurately represent what underpins the counterfactual dependence)
which play an essential role in generating the explanation—since the fictional elements
mediate between P and Q in themodel, which respectively accurately represent A and
B in the target—the misrepresentation does not feature in the explanation itself, since
it concerns A and B alone. In this sense, the models are not fictional with respect to the
explanans, B, they accurately represent those features of their targets, and how varying
those features impacts the explanandum, A, which is also accurately represented.
Now, notice that these explanations do not provide answers to questions like: ‘what
if gravity had been different?’, or ‘what if classical orbits had been different?’. These
latterw-questions, and their potential answers, seem to, at least on the face of it, concern
what if the features of the models were different, rather than what if features of the
targets were different. If the models are supposed to provide first-order explanations
by answering ‘why A?’ questions by invoking the fact that A depends on gravity, or
classical orbits, one shifts from talking about A, to the feature of the model, P , that
(accurately) represents A in the target. Of course one can answer ‘why P?’ with ‘P
depends on R’ in the model—in the case of the tidal behaviour in the model, it depends
on the gravitational force in the model, and in the case of the patterns of conductance
in the model, they depends on the classical orbits in the model—but it is unclear what
these answers are supposed to refer to if we are talking about the behaviour of the
target itself. After all, we know that Newtonian gravity isn’t part of the ontological
furniture of the world, and we know that electrons aren’t the sorts of things that follow
classical orbits. Thus, if we ask what if these features were varied, we’re no longer
talking about the target systems in question. So, whilst Bokulich is right that fictional
models can offer first-order explanations, this observation in itself doesn’t put pressure
on the idea that in order to explain a certain phenomenon a model has to accurately
represent it and (at least some of) its dependencies.
However, let’s suppose for the time being that this is the only explanatory role that
they play (in particular, let’s suppose that they don’t successfully answer the second-
order explanatory questions). I want to highlight that even if this is the case, this
observation goes relatively far in capturing the true but unspecific claim that these
fictional models are, in some sense, explanatory. In particular, I want to highlight
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that by playing this first-order explanatory role, the models already take on a status
beyond being ‘phenomenologicalmodels’ or ‘calculation devices’, at least where these
monikers are used in a pejorative sense (see Bokulich 2008a, p. 227; 2008b, p. 138 ;
2011, p. 44–45 ; 2012). There are three things to note in this regard.
First, in their aforementioned roles, themodels in question are not just used to simply
calculate the value of their behaviour, A, in some particular case. Both the Newtonian
model of the tides and the quantum scarring model provide a wealth of counterfactual
information between their respective behaviour (A: tidal behaviour, conductance pat-
terns) and what it depends on (B: the positions/masses of celestial bodies, the initial
conditions of the wavefunction and the shape of the quantum dots); they don’t just
represent particular values of A, they represent how these values change with values
of B. Second, neither of these models answer the first-order explanatory questions in
a way that involves them being constructed via an ad hoc fitting of the model to the
empirical data (Bokulich 2011, pp. 44–45). Third, neither of these models are ‘inde-
pendent of theory’ in any way that would justify calling them ‘phenomenological’ in
that sense (McMullin 1968). The Newtonian model of the tides obviously draws upon
Newtonian mechanics, and as Bokulich discusses extensively, the quantum dot model,
and models of quantum scarring more generally, draws on a rich interplay between
classical and quantum theory (and with respect to this aspect of her discussion I am in
complete agreement). These considerations, I think, show that the models in question
are not just calculation devices. They do provide explanations, albeit first-order ones.
However, if this is all they do, there is the worry that:
they do not purport to give us any genuine insight into the way the world is. An
explanatory model, by contrast, does aim to give genuine insight into the way
the world is (Bokulich 2011, p. 44), italics added).
Of course if what I argued above is true, they do give us genuine insight into the
way some aspects of the world are (the relationship between A and B). However, one
might still worry that they do not exhibit ‘enough’ explanatory depth; even though the
model might explain A by representing its modal profile with respect to B, this may
strike some as a relatively ‘shallow’ explanation.21 So the next question is whether or
not they give us genuine insight into another aspect of the way the world is (why A
and B exhibit the dependency they do). And this brings us to the question of whether
the fictional models have the explanatory depth to answer second-order explanatory
questions.
21 Obviously the request for explanatory depth cannot be pushed indefinitely: at some point one has to
accept that a model cannot answer every explanatory question about a target. But nevertheless, it does seem




4.2 Fictions and second-order explanations
Recall the second-order questions relevant to the explanations offered by the fictional
models discussed in this paper:
Q1: Why do the tides depend on the positions/masses of the celestial bodies?
A1: Because the celestial bodies exert a certain classical force on one another.
Q2: Why do the patterns of quantum scarring depend on the initial conditions of the
wave function, the shape of the quantum dot, and so on?
A2: Because electrons follow classical trajectories.
The way that the models answer Q1 and Q2 respectively is by invoking a reason why
the dependencies in the target system behave the way they do. The answers invoke a
basis for the counterfactual dependencies. These play the role of R (which is supposed
to accurately represent C) in the Second-Order Model Explanation Condition. The
problem is that in the case of fictional models, R (seems to) inaccurately represent the
actual basis of the counterfactual dependencies in the model: the proposed explanans
isn’t present in the target.22 It’s not gravitational force that determines why the target
tides depend on the positions/masses of the target celestial bodies, it’s rather to do with
the curvature of the spacetime manifold (and we know that this is the case). Of course
there is a relevant counterfactual dependency in the model between gravity and the
relationship between the tides and the positions/masses of the target celestial bodies.
There is also a relevant counterfactual dependency in the target between spacetime
curvature and the relationship between the tides and the positions/masses of the target
celestial bodies. But the dependency in the model is not the same as the dependency
in the target (the former stems from gravity as a force, the latter from spacetime
curvature). It’s not classical orbits that determine why the target conductance peaks
or different quantum scarring patterns arise in different set ups of quantum dots, it’s
interference patterns in the electrons’ wavefunctions, which are spread out throughout
the dot (and again, we know that this is the case, and the respective dependencies in
the model and target are mismatched).
So what should we think about how the models answer the second-order w-
questions, like ‘why do the tides depend on the positions/masses of the celestial
bodies’? If the answers concern what-if-gravity-had-been-different, or what-if-the-
classical-orbits-had-been-different, what is the relevant feature in the world that is
varying? Presumably it’s not gravity, or classical orbits, since we know that the former
isn’t an ontological feature of our world, and we know that electrons aren’t the sorts
of things which follow classical orbits. Of course we can vary the values of gravity,
or classical orbits, in the model. But when we’re asking w-questions, we’re not (pri-
marily) interested in what if things had been different in the model, we’re interested
in what if things had been different in the target. In fact, it’s precisely the fact that
these features (those I have labelled R) in the models in question seem to misrepresent
22 Or alternatively the explanans given is inaccurate. Which reading one prefers here depends on whether
one prefers to adopt an ontic or epistemic account of explanation, i.e. whether one prefers to think of
explanans as things in the world, or our representations of such things. This is relevant to how to phrase
the puzzle I’m discussing here, in terms non-existent explanans or inaccurate explanans, but beyond this it
doesn’t matter too much for my current purposes. See Illari (2013) for a useful discussion.
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what’s actually going on (features I have labelled C, in the cases in question these are
spacetime curvature and wavefunction interactions) that makes the models fictional in
the first place (recall the discussion in Sect. 2).
So, under this reading there is no explanans to vary, and thus these models
don’t successfully answer second-order explanations of the relevant counterfactual
dependencies, because they misrepresent those dependencies. We can ask what-if-R-
had-been-different questions about themodel, but in order to generate the second-order
explanation, we need answers to what-if-C-had been different. And if R is what makes
the model a fiction, in the sense of misrepresenting the ontology of C, it is not obvious
how these latter questions can be answered, and thus no second-order explanation is
provided (I take it that Bokulich agrees with this, since because ‘gravity’ and ‘classical
orbits’ aren’t features of the targets, they do not enter into counterfactual dependencies
with other features of the targets, tidal range and the behaviour of the dot, which is,
by her own lights, what is required for explanation). So, and this is the first horn of
the dilemma for the defender of the idea that fictional models explain qua fictions:
they don’t provide second-order explanations precisely because they are fictional in
the relevant sense (and thus the only explanations that they do provide, the first-order
ones, are not misrepresentations).
However, an account of explanation according to which such models fail to provide
second-order explanations is fairly conservative. One might argue that the Newtonian
model doesn’t just explain the tidal range, it also explains why the tidal range depends
on the positions/masses of the relevant celestial bodies, despite, or even in virtue
of, the fact that a purported explanation offered by the model invokes forces that
we know don’t exist. One might claim that the model of quantum dots doesn’t just
explain the conductance patterns, it also explains why those patterns depends on the
shape of the dot and the initial conditions of the set up, despite, or even in virtue
of, the fact that this explanation invokes the idea that electrons travel in classical
orbits. One might demand a more liberal account of explanation in order to allow for
the pre-theoretical intuition that such models don’t just offer first-order explanations
by accurately representing counterfactual dependencies of the target system, they also
provide second-order explanations of the counterfactual dependencies themselves even
though they misrepresent the ontological basis that gives rise to them.23 I admit, when
I’m feeling particularly open minded about explanation I feel the pull of this in certain
cases.
Whilst Bokulich is not explicit about the precise explanatory questions that themod-
els she investigates can successfully answer, I think when pressed she would agree that
they can provide successful second-order explanations, since it’s precisely here where
their fictional nature seems to lead to the philosophical question concerning how
fictional (in the sense of misrepresenting) models can explain.24 As we have seen,
23 It’s not clear tome that this pre-theoretical intuition should be granted, especially since it can be explained
away by the idea that it is motivated by a confusion between first-order and second-order explanations, i.e.
because such models provide first-order explanations we expect them to provide second-order explanations
too. But why expect that?
24 Although this may depend on the details of the case. For example, in her (2011, p. 44). She writes ‘Bohr’s
model does genuinely explain the Balmer series, though the explanation it offers may not be as deep as that
offered by modern quantum mechanics, and moreover, the explanation offered by modern (nonrelativistic)
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whilst the fictional features of the models in question play an essential, but instru-
mental, role in generating the relevant first-order explanations, they do not feature in
those explanations themselves, which only make reference to the modal profile of the
explanans and explanandum, which are accurately represented by the models in ques-
tion. So if the presence of fictional models in science is supposed to challenge the idea
that explanation requires accurate representation, thenwe should turn towhether or not
the fictional elements themselves play a direct explanatory role.25 The next step then
is to investigate how these models can play such a role, which requires investigating
the relationship between their fictional aspects (R features), and the actual ontology of
their targets (C features). It’s here where Bokulich faces the other horn of the dilemma:
these models can provide second-order explanations, but to do so involves reinter-
preting them as not being fictional; interpreting them in such a way that they don’t
radically misrepresent the ontological basis that generates the relevant counterfactual
dependencies, or so I will argue. This undercuts the philosophically novel aspects of
her discussions in the sense that it blunts the threat that explanatory fictional models
might have on the idea that accurate representation is necessary for explanation.
Recall the distinction between fictional and non-fictional idealisations discussed
in Sect. 2. Non-fictional idealisations were taken to get the ontology of their targets
right, but to distort that ontology in a way that didn’t involve representing the target as
having some feature known not to be present in the target. Fictional models misrep-
resented the very ontology present in the target system. The puzzle arises if fictional
models are taken to provide second-order explanations whilst misrepresenting what
it is that actually underpins the relevant dependencies. In the case of the tidal model,
there are Newtonian forces in the model which determine the counterfactual depen-
dencies of the tides (in the model) on the celestial positions/masses (in the model).
And it was assumed that the model thereby represented counterfactual dependency
of tidal behaviour in the target on the celestial positions/masses (in the target) as
being determined by Newtonian forces. Thus, the model is fictional and yet still pro-
vides what might feel like a successful second-order explanation despite not meeting
the Second-Order Model Explanation Condition (in virtue of misrepresenting the
counterfactuals’ ontological basis). But, just because those forces are present in the
model, it needn’t be the case that the model represents those forces as being present
in the target. Just because a model has some feature doesn’t mean it represents its
target as having that feature, any more than statue being made of bronze represents its
subject as being made of bronze.
This brings us to the topic of how models represent. It’s commonplace in the litera-
ture on scientific representation that there is a central role formodel users in interpreting
which features of their models play a representational role, and indeed what proposed
target features those model-features are supposed to represent (for reviews of this lit-
erature see Frigg and Nguyen 2016b, 2017, 2020). According to Frigg and Nguyen
Footnote 24 continued
quantum mechanics may not be as deep as that offered by quantum field theory’, suggesting that she grants
that, in at least some cases, fictional models may not provide deep, i,e. second-order, explanations.
25 An alternative possibility, which I discuss in the conclusion, is that these fictional elements feature in
some alternative first-order explanations. However, as I argue there, for them to do so, they still have to be
interpreted in such a way as to rob them of their fictional status.
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(2016a, 2018) models come with ‘keys’ that specify which features of a model are
associated with which features the model exports to the target system. According to
Suárez (2004, 2015), models represent their targets only if they allow competent and
informed agents to draw specific inferences about their targets.26 According toHughes
(1997), models are such that results obtained by ‘demonstrations’ on the model can
be ‘interpreted’ in terms of their targets. What all of these accounts have in common
is that the inferences that a user draws about the target can, but need not, be of the
form ‘the target has similar features to the model’; that is, they needn’t be of the form
‘if a model has a relevant feature P , the target has P , or a feature similar to P .27
The ‘key’ that connects model-features with features to be exported to their targets,
or the inferences/interpretations made by competent and well informed agents, may
allow for a mismatch between model-features and features that the model represents
the target as having, whilst still allowing for accurate representation of the latter. A
caricature of a person with a large nose doesn’t have to represent its subject as having
a large nose. In the appropriate context the large nose plays the role of representing
the target as a liar, or as having a nosey character (Elgin 2017, Chapter 12). In these
cases the key takes a feature of the representation and transforms it into another to be
exported to the target. Or alternatively, the competent and well informed agent knows
to interpret the the feature of the caricature—having a large nose—as representing a
different feature of the target, namely that s/he is a liar, or is overly interested in other
peoples’ business. Either way, the feature of the model isn’t carried over to the target
directly, there is a mismatch between the model-features and the feature the model
represents the target as having.
Oneway of putting this is that the representational content of amodel is a function of
both the model-features and the key or inferential rules used to interpret it. With this in
mind, just because Newtonian gravity is a feature of the model this doesn’t mean that it
is part of the representational content of the model. The key or rule that is used to inter-
pret themodel, when applied to the features of themodel involving fictional forces, can
translate them to entirely different features to be exported to the target. And the repre-
sentational content of the model will involve the claim that the target has the exported
features rather than the model-features, just as the representational content of the cari-
cature is that the person is a liar or has a nosey character, rather than having a large nose.
Now, earlier I said that a model is a fiction if it misrepresents the ontology of the
target in such a way as to represent the target as having features which we know are
not there. But as applied to the Newtonian model of tides, that relies on the idea that
26 Here I’m assuming that the competent and well informed agents use some sort of inferential rule to draw
these inferences. I take it that these rules correspond to what Suárez (2010) describes as the ‘means’ of
representation. In keeping with Suárez’s ‘deflationary’ way of thinking, I’m not assuming that these rules,
or means, are the same across all instances of scientific representation, just that in the relevant cases in
question, they allow competent model users to infer truths about their targets from features of the models
that don’tmatch features of their targets. For example, just because, in theNewtonianmodel, the dependency
of tidal behaviour on celestial positions depends on gravity, a competent and well informed agent needn’t
use the model to infer that in the world the dependency of tidal behaviour on celestial positions depends on
a classical gravitational force, they can infer that the former dependency itself depends on something else
(i.e., to preempt what’s to come, spacetime curvature).




the model represents the counterfactual dependence of tidal variance on celestial posi-
tions/masses in the target as being determined by gravitational forces. But the model
doesn’t have to be, and in fact, I argue, typically isn’t (these days), interpreted that way.
One way of interpreting the model is to explicitly not export gravitational forces to
the target, but rather to export something like ‘being determined by spacetime curva-
ture in such a way that the effect will approximate the effect of classical gravitational
forces’. As far as I can see, even once we accept that the gravitational model offers a
first-order explanation in terms representing the tides’ counterfactual dependence on
the positions/masses of the sun, earth, and moon, the intuition that the gravitational
model additionally provides a second-order explanation ofwhy tidal variance depends
on these positions/masses, is not because it represents the actual tides as being deter-
mined by Newtonian gravitational forces, but rather because our interpretation of the
model is embedded in a broader theoretical framework where we know that at the
appropriate speeds and masses any actual system will by approximated by a Newto-
nian system. So, suitably interpreted, the model doesn’t represent the relevant tidal
counterfactual relationships as being determined by Newtonian gravity, but represents
them as being determined by something which is approximated by Newtonian gravity
in the appropriate regimes.28
The same applies to the quantum dot model. Rather than exporting ‘the electrons
follow classical orbits’, we export ‘the electrons’ quantum behaviour is approximated
by those classical orbits’.Again, ifwewant the quantumdotmodel to provide a second-
order explanation, it is not because it represents the actual electrons as classical objects,
but rather because our interpretation of the model is embedded in a broader theoretical
framework relating quantum and classical physics in a semiclassical way. In fact,
in both cases, it’s because the models are embedded in their respective theoretical
frameworks (i.e., we know how to connect the, if literally interpreted then inaccurate,
models,with theories thatwe take to be accurate), that themodels canbe seen to provide
second-order explanations. And what these connections allow for is the possibility of
providing the interpretations that explicitly do not export the (inaccurate) ontological
bases for the counterfactual behaviour in question, but rather export the actual ontology
of the system with the proviso that it is approximated by the model’s one in the
appropriate regimes.29
In a sense then, my argument here is in agreement with Suárez’s (2009c) treatment
of ‘fictive’ models.30 As noted at the beginning of this subsection, according to his
account of representation, models have to licence inferences about their targets. And in
28 To further motivate this claim, it might be useful to think of a world where we hadn’t discovered general
relativity, but we nevertheless knew that gravitational forces didn’t exist in the Newtonian sense. In such
a world I take it that the key sketched here wouldn’t be applied to the model. Therefore, I think that in
such a world the model wouldn’t explain the second-order question of why tidal variance depends on the
positions/masses of the earth, sun, and the moon (although I still think it would explain tidal variance itself).
Turning this point on its head, we can consider the impact of the discovery of inter-theory relations between
relativistic and Newtonian theories. My claim here is that such discoveries can contribute to the explanatory
power of Newtonian models, in virtue of impacting how they are interpreted.
29 At this point one could ask yet another explanatory question: why does the actual ontology approximate
the ontology of the model? Here I take it the answer would be provided by the connections between the
theoretical frameworks in which they are embedded.
30 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to be explicit about this.
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the case of fictive models, these inferences can have true conclusions, even though the
models and their targets are not similar, or isomorphic, to one another in the relevant
sense. However, in such cases, the sense in which the models should be considered
fictive is no longer obvious. Even though the descriptions used to present thosemodels,
if evaluatedwith respect to the target system rather than themodel, are false (or are such
that their truth-value is irrelevant to their function), it doesn’t follow that the ‘fictive’
models themselves should be considered misrepresentations of the relevant aspects of
their targets. In the context of the indirect view of modelling, these descriptions should
not be evaluated with respect to the target system; they serve to describe themodel, and
the question is how the model represents (recall the discussion in Sect. 2). And in fact,
on the natural way of understanding these models, interpreted in the manner I have
discussed, they are no longer ‘fictive’ in the sense that they no longer misrepresent the
features of the targets they licence inferences about, since the inferences they end up
licensing are, in the relevant cases, true.
Returning back to Bokulich, so far I have been suppressing a crucial aspect of her
account of model explanation, a condition that is highly relevant to the question of the
ways in which fictional models explain. She has another condition on model explana-
tion; a justificatory step that specifies ‘what the domain of applicability of the model
is, and show[s] that the phenomenon in the real world to be explained falls within
that domain’ (Bokulich 2008b, p. 226). In the current context I’m going to interpret
this step as a justification for how (some) fictional models can provide second-order
explanations (the step could also reasonably be interpreted in terms of providing first-
order explanations but I have already discussed that above). In the case of fictional
model explanations she claims that this justificatory step is performed in a ‘top-down’
manner; the relevant theories involved (in the cases in question these theories include
classical mechanics and general relativity, and our understanding of the relationship
between the two, and classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, and our under-
standing of the relationship between the two) specify that the models in question are
applicable to the target systems in question (Bokulich 2008a, p. 239; 2008b, p. 146;
2011, p. 39; 2012, p. 736; 2016, pp. 273–274). Since we’re in the business of talking
about application in terms of second-order explanations, it seems like the best way
of interpreting how they do this is to accept that they provide information about how
variances inR correspond to variances in the actual ontology (C) of the system, thereby
allowing us to translate between what-if-R-had-been-different-questions-and-answers
and what-if-C-had-been-different-questions-and-answers, where R is the ontological
basis of the counterfactuals in the model and C is the ontological basis of the coun-
terfactuals in the target.
This point, that fictional models can be interpreted via a key, or inferential rule, that
translates their ontological basis into a different ontological basis to be exported to the
target, is made in Bokulich’s own discussion of how the quantum dot model explains:
the theory of semiclassical mechanics provides physicists with what we might
call a well-defined translation key, whereby statements about classical trajecto-
ries can be translated into true conclusions about the actual morphology of the
wave function of the quantum dot. Note that the translation key given by semi-
classical mechanics [...] is not from the empirical predictions generated by the
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fictions to the empirical predictions generated by the true description [...] Rather
the translation key is from statements about the fictions to statements about
the underlying structures or causes of the explanandum phenomenon (Bokulich
2012, p. 735).
But once she accepts this, then in combinationwith the aforementionedwayof thinking
about scientific representation, she undercuts her own claim that fictional models
explain qua fictions. And this pulls the rug from under her project of developing
an account of scientific explanation that drops the idea that accurate representation is
necessary for explanation.31 Once the fictional models are interpreted in this way, they
are no longer fictions in the sense ofmisrepresenting the ontologyof their targets. These
translation keys or inferential rules specify the representational content of the models.
And if one thinks that the models can generate successful second-order explanations,
then a key or rule needs to be in place according towhich themodels don’tmisrepresent
said ontology. By paying due attention to the ways in which competent and informed
model users draw inferences from models to their target, or alternatively, the keys that
accompany them, either of which is in part generated by the theoretical context in
which they are embedded, models that explain the basis of the causal dependencies in
question need no longer be seen as fictional.32
This, I think, poses a dilemma for a staunch defender of the view that fictional
models can explain. The dilemma concerns whether or not they can answer second-
order explanatory questions. If they can’t, I think this is precisely because they are
fictional in the specific respect at issue. If they can, the details of such an explanation
require reinterpreting them so as to ensure that they don’t misrepresent the ontological
basis for the counterfactual dependence. Either way, once the explanatory question is
suitably specified, there is no philosophical puzzle concerning how a fictional misrep-
resentation of some target feature can explain that specific feature.
5 Conclusion
Before concluding then, it is worth revisiting the role of fictions in first-order explana-
tions. Recall that a model provides a first-order explanation of some target behaviour
31 There are other philosophical projects where the same reasoning applies. See Frigg and Nguyen (2019)
for a discussion of how the possibility of interpreting models in a non-literal manner blunts the need for
an epistemology of science based on the idea that models provide ‘felicitous falsehoods’, rather than truths
(cf. Elgin 2017). Saatsi (2019) provides a useful discussion of related issues in the context of thinking about
scientific realism.
32 It’s worth briefly mentioning how this aspect of my discussion relates to Schindler’s (2014) criticism of
Bokulich’s account. In the terminology of this paper, he argues that because the ‘top-level’ theories allow us
to generate the actual ontological counterfactuals involving C from the model’s counterfactuals involving
R, Bokulich requires an additional argument ‘for why it is the model, rather than quantum mechanics [or
in the case of the tides, presumably general relatively], which does the real explanatory work’ (Schindler
2014, p. 1747). Here I agree with Bokulich that fictional models can still play a crucial explanatory role; just
because the models require interpretation via the theories in question, this doesn’t mean that the theories
themselves, without the fictional models, would suffice to generate the explanations offered by the models
even when the latter are interpreted via an appeal to the theories. See Bokulich (2008a, pp. 232–233; 2008b,
Chapter 6) for argument to this effect.
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A only if it accurately represents A’s modal profile with respect to some explanans
B. In the discussion in Sect. 4.1, I argued that in the explanations in question, those
explanans were things like the positions/masses of the celestial bodies and the initial
conditions of the quantumdot, features that themodels also accurately represent (when
interpreted literally). However, it’s plausible that the features that were the explanans
in the second-order explanations discussed in the previous section (e.g. spacetime cur-
vature, which approximates Newtonian gravity in the appropriate regime), can also
feature in first-order explanations as well.33
One could think about this in two ways. First, one could argue that without invok-
ing ‘gravity’ or ‘classical orbits’, the first-order explanations discussed in Sect. 4.1
are unsatisfactory: yes tidal range depends on the positions/masses of celestial bodies
but only because the positions/masses make a difference to gravitational attraction,
and thus gravity cannot be excluded from those first-order explanations. This is sug-
gested, for example, by Bokulich herself who states that physical oceanographers ‘are
interested in how gravity interacts with other factors to produce the complex tidal
phenomena that they are trying to explain and understand’ (Bokulich 2016, p. 273).
Without understanding how the positions/masses of the celestial bodies interact with
gravity, they do not provide a sufficient first-order explanation. Second, and relat-
edly, one could argue that ‘gravity’ and ‘classical orbits’ themselves provide us with
first-order explanations. After all, we might also be able to use the model to answer
questions like ‘how would changes to “gravity” affect the tidal positions?’, and thus
also invoke ‘gravity’ as an alternative first-order explanation to the tidal range.
With respect to the first claim, I take it that whether or not the positions/masses
of the celestial bodies suffices for a first-order explanation depends on the level of
explanatory depth required by the context. If the first-order explanation isn’t sufficient,
and one demands to know why the tides depends on the celestial positions/masses,
then one is, in effect, demanding a second-order explanation. But notice that this is not
to say that in contexts where the first-order explanation is sufficient, that the fictions
don’t appear at all. As I have discussed throughout, the fictional aspects of the model
are still essential in the generation of the explanation, because they play an essential
role in structuring the counterfactual dependencies in themodel, they just don’t feature
in the content of the explanation itself (cf. Lawler 2019). With respect to the second
claim, that the fictional aspects of models may themselves provide alternative first-
order explanations, notice that in order tomake sense of the counterfactual dependency
of the tidal range on ‘gravity’, in the sense of answering questions concerning how
the tidal range (in the world) would differ were gravity to differ, we would also have
to interpret ‘gravity’ (or more accurately, the gravitational force in the model) in a
non-literal way. As previously discussed, asking how the tidal range would change
were (Newtonian) gravity different, amounts to an infelicitous shift between talk of
the target and talk of the model. If we are to talk solely in terms of the target, then, to
be precise, we have to ask how the tidal range would change, were what in the target
that approximates Newtonian gravity in the appropriate regimes to change. And again,
to answer these sorts of questions the models have to be interpreted in such a way that
they are not misrepresentations. So, if the fictional elements of models are taken to
33 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point.
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provide first-order explanations, then they can only do so by being interpreted in such
a way that they are no longer fictional in the relevant respects.
To conclude. I have argued that fictional models, in the sense of models that appear
to misrepresent the ontology of their target systems (rather than distorting the actual
ontology), can explain certain kinds of features of their targets’ behaviour. Namely, I
have argued that a fictional model can explain a certain target feature by accurately
representingwhatever it is that the feature counterfactually depends on. For these kinds
of explanations, the fictional aspects of the model play an essential role in generating
the explanation, but do not feature in the explanation itself. However, I have argued that
there is a second kind of explanatory question that onemight also think fictionalmodels
can answer. It’s in answering these sorts of questions that I think the real philosophical
puzzle concerning fictional models comes to the fore, and I have suggested that either
fictional models should not be taken to successfully answer such questions, precisely
because they are fictional, or if one thinks that they do offer these sorts of explanations,
then they do so in a way that robs them of their fictional status.
The crucial take home message of this paper then is that fictional models qua
fictions—i.e., interpreted in such a way that makes them drastic misrepresentations
of their targets—do not explain those features that they misrepresent, again precisely
because they are fictional. However, if they are interpreted differently, by competent
and well informed agents, using a key that allows for model-features to be associated
with the actual features of the target, then they can play such an explanatory role, but
this undercuts the idea that they are fictional (at least in the way that Bokulich uses the
term). So the puzzle that seems to arise from models that drastically misrepresent the
ontology of their targets, and yet still appear to be explanatory, dissolves. If I am right,
then the existence of explanatory fictions in science gives us no reason to give up on
the idea that the accurate representation of some target feature remains a necessary
condition on explaining that specific feature.
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